Updating Description Logics using the AGM Theory

Giorgos Flouris, Dimitris Plexousakis, Grigoris Antoniou
Institute of Computer Science, FO.R.T.H.
P.O. Box 1385, GR 71110, Heraklion, Greece
{fgeo, dp, antoniou}@ics.forth.gr

Abstract

We consider the use of belief change techniques to address the problem of updating Knowledge Bases (KBs) based on Description Logics (DLs). We focus on the feasibility of the application of the AGM theory in DL KBs, evaluate the difficulties of the approach and determine the applicability of the method in certain families of DLs. For those DLs that are found compatible with the AGM model, we also describe a contraction operator that satisfies the AGM postulates. Finally, as an application of interest in the area of the Semantic Web, we study OWL, a W3C recommendation, and show that it is incompatible with the AGM model.

1 Introduction

The development of computer systems that can perform commonsense reasoning is a complex and multifaceted task. One of the crucial tasks that such a system should perform is to maintain a KB and update it dynamically to accommodate new information. This problem has been extensively studied for certain classes of representation languages in the area of *belief change* [Gärdenfors, 1992], the dominating approach being the work by Alchourron, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) in [Alchourron *et al.*, 1985].

Despite its apparent importance, the problem of KB updating has been generally overlooked [Lee and Meyer, 2004] in the literature relevant to DLs, an important family of logics [Baader *et al.*, 2002]. We believe it is useful to apply the results of the belief change literature (more specifically the AGM theory) to this problem. This approach has been recently considered in [Flouris *et al.*, 2004a; Kang and Lau, 2004; Lee and Meyer, 2004].

Unfortunately, the AGM model cannot be directly applied to DL KBs, as the assumptions originally made by AGM overrule DLs. We addressed this problem in [Flouris *et al.*, 2004a; Flouris *et al.*, 2004b], where we introduced a generalization of the AGM theory and determined the feasibility of the approach in a wide class of logics. In the current paper we specialize our results to DLs by formulating conditions under which it can be decided whether the generalized AGM theory is applicable in a DL or not. Furthermore, we apply our method to some specific DLs that have been considered in the literature, the most important one being OWL [Dean *et al.*, 2004], a language with several applications in the Semantic Web.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Description Logics

The term *Description Logics* [Baader *et al.*, 2002] refers to a family of knowledge representation languages, heavily used in the Semantic Web. The basic blocks that are used to represent knowledge in DLs are *classes* (representing concepts), *roles* (representing binary relationships between concepts) and *individuals* (representing individual objects). These are used to form more complex expressions (*terms*) using certain *operators*. Knowledge is represented using *axioms*; an axiom represents a certain relationship (such as inclusion, membership and others) between terms using certain *connectives*.

The part of the DL KB dealing with concepts and roles is called the *Tbox*, while individuals are described in the *Abox*. The operators and connectives that a certain DL admits determine the type and complexity of the available axioms, which, in turn, determine the expressive power and the reasoning complexity of the DL.

The formal semantics of DLs is defined using *interpretations* I which consist of a non-empty set Δ^I and a function ^{I} which maps every concept A to a set $A^I \subseteq \Delta^I$, every role R to a relation $R^I \subseteq \Delta^I \times \Delta^I$ and every individual x to an object $x^I \in \Delta^I$. This mapping is extended to terms using the semantics of each operator; for example $(A \sqcap B)^I = A^I \cap B^I$. The semantics of each connective determines whether an axiom is *satisfied* by a certain interpretation; for example the axiom $A \sqcap B \sqsubseteq C$ is satisfied by the interpretation I iff $(A \sqcap B)^I \subseteq C^I$. Analogously, a set of axioms is *satisfied* by an interpretation I iff all the axioms in the set are satisfied by I. A set of axioms X *implies* Y ($X \vDash Y$) iff all interpretations I that satisfy X also satisfy Y. A more detailed account on the semantics of the operators and connectives of DLs can be found in [Baader *et al.*, 2002].

The importance of DLs stems from the fact that they play a primary role in the area of representation languages for ontologies [Baader *et al.*, 2003]. For this reason, any research on DLs is expected to find immediate applications in the field of the Semantic Web. The aim of our research is to study the update-theoretic properties of DLs, an area of DL research which has been generally disregarded in the literature [Lee and Meyer, 2004]. This study may help in the automation of the task of ontology maintenance by indicating rational methods of ontology updating.

2.2 Belief Change and the AGM Postulates

The AGM theory [Alchourron *et al.*, 1985] is undoubtedly the most influential work in the area of belief change. In this work, three fundamental operators of belief change were defined, as well as a set of rationality postulates (commonly referred to as the *AGM postulates*) that should apply to each belief change operation. The importance of the above model lies in the fact that AGM defined some widely accepted properties that any rational belief change operator should satisfy, thus setting the foundations for future research on the subject.

In our paper, we restrict our attention to the operation of *contraction* (denoted by '−') which refers to the removal of a piece of information from a KB when this information is no longer believed. Contraction was chosen because, according to AGM, it is the most fundamental among the three belief change operators. Indeed, the theoretical importance of contraction has been accepted by most researchers, even though in practical applications *revision* (which refers to addition of information) is more often used.

In the AGM model, contraction is a binary operator between a KB K closed under logical consequence and a proposition x. According to AGM, a contraction operator should satisfy six postulates, which reflect common intuition on what "removal of information" means. These postulates can be found in [Alchourron *et al.*, 1985].

2.3 Rationality of Belief Change

We believe that the concept of "rationality" of a belief change operator is independent of the underlying knowledge representation scheme. Since the AGM theory formally encodes common intuition about the properties that a rational belief change operator should satisfy, we believe that it would be of interest to apply the AGM model to all logics and operators in order to determine the "rationality" of a given belief change operator in a given logic. This includes DLs, which are the focus of this paper.

Unfortunately though, the AGM theory itself does depend on the underlying language, since it is based on certain assumptions which place it in a certain context, making it applicable mainly in the context of Propositional and First-Order Logic. For this reason, the results of AGM cannot be directly applied to many interesting logics (including DLs).

Indeed, many AGM assumptions fail for DLs. For example, AGM assume the existence of certain operators in the logic such as ¬, ∧ etc. This is not generally true for DLs; for example, the negation of an axiom x (say x="A⊓B⊑C") cannot be defined in general. Furthermore, many DLs are not compact, which is another AGM assumption.

This problem was originally noticed and addressed in a very general context in [Flouris *et al.*, 2004a], by reformulating the AGM postulates to make sense in a class of logics far wider than the one AGM originally considered. In that paper, we reformulated the postulates so that they can be applied to any logic that is definable as a pair <L,Cn>, where L is a set containing all the expressions of the logic and Cn is a *consequence operator* that satisfies the Tarskian axioms (iteration, inclusion, monotony).

Furthermore, we assumed that contraction is a binary operator applicable between two sets K, A, which are sets of expressions of the underlying logic (K,A⊆L). Following that, we reformulated the AGM postulates to make sense in this more general context. The generalized postulates that resulted from this work can be found in the following list, where the naming and numbering of each postulate corresponds to the original AGM naming and numbering:

(K−1) Closure: $Cn(K−A)=K−A$
(K−2) Inclusion: $K−A⊆Cn(K)$
(K−3) Vacuity: If $A⊄Cn(K)$, then $K−A=Cn(K)$
(K−4) Success: If $A⊄Cn(∅)$, then $A⊄Cn(K−A)$
(K−5) Preservation: If $Cn(A)=Cn(B)$, then $K−A=K−B$
(K−6) Recovery: $K⊆Cn((K−A)∪A)$

2.4 AGM-compliance

Upon attempt to apply the generalized AGM postulates to certain logics, we noticed that this was possible only in some of the logics in our generalized framework. In other words, several logics (not in the original AGM framework) cannot admit any contraction operator that satisfies the generalized AGM postulates. On the bright side, there are also logics outside the original AGM framework, in which a contraction operator that satisfies the generalized AGM postulates can be defined.

Following this observation, we introduced the notion of *AGM-compliant logics*. A logic was defined to be AGM-compliant iff a contraction operator that satisfies the six generalized AGM postulates can be defined in this logic. This class of logics was characterized using the following proposition [Flouris *et al.*, 2004b]:

Proposition 1 A logic <L,Cn> is AGM-compliant iff for all sets X, Y⊆L such that $Cn(∅)⊂Cn(Y)⊂Cn(X)$ there is a set Z⊆L such that $Cn(Z)⊂Cn(X)$ and $Cn(Y∪Z)=Cn(X)$.

Using this result, any given logic can be checked for AGM-compliance, provided that it is definable as a pair <L,Cn>. In [Flouris *et al.*, 2004b] we also showed that if the set Z required by proposition 1 actually exists, then it can be used to define an AGM-compliant contraction operator, by setting X−Y=Cn(Z).

The above results can be directly applied to DLs, since, for any given DL, we can take L to be the set of all possible axioms that can be formed in this DL (such as A≅B⊓∀R.C) and Cn(X) the set of all implications of a set of axioms X⊆L under the standard model-theoretic semantics of DLs [Baader *et al.*, 2002].

In the current paper, we exploit this fact to determine the AGM-compliance of certain DLs, by formulating conditions that guarantee or bar AGM-compliance (sections 3 and 4 respectively). In section 5, we apply our results to certain DLs that have been considered in the literature, the most important one being OWL [Dean *et al.*, 2004], a language with several applications in the Semantic Web, which has become a W3C recommendation. We conclude by discussing the merits as well as the limitations of our method and proposing interesting topics of future work on the subject (section 6).

3 Conditions for AGM-compliance

3.1 General Intuition and Initial Results

Throughout this section, we will assume a DL that allows for the top concept $\top$ and the connective $\sqsubseteq$ (applicable to concept terms, at least), plus an arbitrary number of other connectives and/or operators. We will use the consequence operator Cn as given by the standard model-theoretic semantics of DLs [Baader *et al.*, 2002].

The guiding intuition for our approach is the following observation: take two (singular) sets of DL axioms of the form $X=\{A\sqsupseteq\top\}$, $Y=\{B\sqsupseteq\top\}$ for which it holds that $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$. The set $Z=\{A\sqsupseteq B\}$ is a good candidate for the set required by proposition 1, since, obviously, $Cn(Z)\subseteq Cn(X)$ and $Cn(Y\cup Z)=Cn(X)$. There is a catch though: proposition 1 requires that $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$; in the above naïve approach sometimes it so happens that $Cn(Z)=Cn(X)$. To see this, take $B=\neg A\sqcup\exists R.A\sqcup\forall R.\bot$ for some role R (example provided by Thomas Studer, personal communication). To deal with this problem, the idea must be refined in order to guarantee that $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$. This refinement is described and proved in a more general setting in the following lemma:

Lemma 1 Consider the sets of axioms $X=\{A_j\sqsupseteq\top \mid j\in J\}$ and $Y=\{B\sqsupseteq\top\}$. If $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$ and there is an interpretation I such that $B^I=\varnothing$, then there is a set Z such that $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$ and $Cn(Y\cup Z)=Cn(X)$.

Proof
Set $Z=\{A_j\sqsupseteq B \mid j\in J\}$. If we suppose that $Z\vDash X$, then, since $X\vDash Y$, we conclude that $Z\vDash Y$. However, by the hypothesis, there is an interpretation I such that $B^I=\varnothing$; for this interpretation, Z is obviously satisfied, while Y is not, which is a contradiction. So $Z\nvDash X$ but $X\vDash Z$, i.e., $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$. The second relation, $Cn(Y\cup Z)=Cn(X)$, follows easily using the transitivity of $\sqsubseteq$. □

3.2 Generalizing to Arbitrary Axioms

Lemma 1 defines the set Z required by proposition 1, but only for sets of a special form. This might cause one to believe that it is of limited use; on the contrary, this lemma forms the backbone of our theory. Before showing that, we will show that the prerequisites of proposition 1 need only be checked for a subset of all the possible (X, Y) pairs:

Lemma 2 Consider a logic <L,Cn> and two sets X, Y⊆L, such that $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$. If there are sets X′, Y′⊆L such that $Cn(X')=Cn(X)$, $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y')\subseteq Cn(Y)$ and a set Z⊆L such that $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X')$ and $Cn(Y'\cup Z)=Cn(X')$ then $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$ and $Cn(Y\cup Z)=Cn(X)$.

Proof
Obviously $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X')=Cn(X)$.
Furthermore, since $Cn(Y')\subseteq Cn(Y)$ we conclude that $Cn(Y\cup Z)\supseteq Cn(Y'\cup Z)=Cn(X')=Cn(X)$. Combining this with the facts that $Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$ and $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$ we get $Cn(Y\cup Z)=Cn(X)$ and the proof is complete. □

Now consider a DL and any two sets of axioms X, Y such that $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$. If X and Y are of the form required by lemma 1, then we are done; lemma 1 allows us to find a set Z that satisfies the requirements of proposition

Axiom	Equivalent axiom of the proper form	Required operators
$A\sqsubseteq B$	$\neg A\sqcup B\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup$
$R\sqsubseteq S$	$\forall(R\sqcap\neg S).\bot\sqsupseteq\top$	$\bot,\forall,\neg_R,\sqcap_R$
$A\not\sqsubseteq B$	$\exists\top_R.(A\sqcap\neg B)\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcap,\exists,\top_R$
$R\not\sqsubseteq S$	$\exists\top_R.\exists(R\sqcap\neg S).\top\sqsupseteq\top$	$\exists,\top_R,\neg_R,\sqcap_R$
$A\equiv B$	$(\neg A\sqcup B)\sqcap(A\sqcup\neg B)\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\sqcap$
$R\equiv S$	$\forall(R\sqcap\neg S).\bot\sqcap$ $\forall(S\sqcap\neg R).\bot\sqsupseteq\top$	$\bot,\sqcap,\forall,$ $\neg_R,\sqcap_R$
$A\not\equiv B$	$\exists\top_R.[(A\sqcap\neg B)\sqcup$ $(B\sqcap\neg A)]\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcap,\sqcup,$ $\exists,\top_R$
$R\not\equiv S$	$\exists\top_R.\exists[(\neg R\sqcap S)\sqcup$ $(\neg S\sqcap R)].\top\sqsupseteq\top$	$\exists,\top_R,$ $\neg_R,\sqcap_R,\sqcup_R$
$A\sqsubset B$	$(\neg A\sqcup B)\sqcap$ $\exists\top_R.(B\sqcap\neg A)\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcap,\sqcup,$ $\exists,\top_R$
$R\sqsubset S$	$\forall(R\sqcap\neg S).\bot\sqcap$ $\exists\top_R.\exists(S\sqcap\neg R).\top\sqsupseteq\top$	$\bot,\sqcap,\exists,\forall,$ $\top_R,\neg_R,\sqcap_R$
$A\backslash\sqsubset B$	$\forall\top_R.\exists\top_R.(A\sqcap\neg B)\sqcup$ $\forall\top_R.(\neg B\sqcup A)\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcap,\sqcup,$ $\exists,\forall,\top_R$
$R\backslash\sqsubset S$	$\forall\top_R.\exists\top_R.\exists(R\sqcap\neg S).\top\sqcup$ $\forall\top_R.\forall(S\sqcap\neg R).\bot\sqsupseteq\top$	$\bot,\sqcup,\exists,\forall,$ $\top_R,\neg_R,\sqcap_R$
disj(A,B)	$\neg A\sqcup\neg B\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup$
disj(R,S)	$\forall(R\sqcap S).\bot\sqsupseteq\top$	$\bot,\forall,\sqcap_R$
$a\in A$	$\neg\{a\}\sqcup A\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\{...\}$
$a\notin A$	$\neg\{a\}\sqcup\neg A\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\{...\}$
$a=b$	$\neg\{a\}\sqcup\{b\}\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\{...\}$
$a\neq b$	$\neg\{a\}\sqcup\neg\{b\}\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\{...\}$
$(a,b)\in R$	$\exists R.\{b\}\sqcup\neg\{a\}\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\exists,\{...\}$
$(a,b)\notin R$	$\neg\exists R.\{b\}\sqcup\neg\{a\}\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,\exists,\{...\}$
$(a,b)=(a',b')$	$(\neg\{a\}\sqcup\{a'\})\sqcap$ $(\neg\{b\}\sqcup\{b'\})\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcup,$ $\sqcap,\{...\}$
$(a,b)\neq(a',b')$	$\exists\top_R.((\{a\}\sqcap\neg\{a'\})\sqcup$ $(\{b\}\sqcap\neg\{b'\}))\sqsupseteq\top$	$\neg,\sqcap,\sqcup,$ $\exists,\top_R,\{...\}$

Table 1: Transforming DL axioms into the form $A\sqsupseteq\top$

1 for an AGM-compliant logic. If, on the other hand, X or Y are not of the desired form, lemma 2 shows the way; all we need is to find two sets X′, Y′ of the desired form such that $Cn(X')=Cn(X)$ and $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y')\subseteq Cn(Y)$. Then, lemma 1 can be applied for X′, Y′ and the resulting set Z can be propagated to X, Y, using lemma 2. The important question is, are there sets X′, Y′ with the desired properties? The answer depends on the underlying DL.

Let us deal with X′ first. One possible way to find X′ is to take each axiom x∈X and transform it independently into the desired form ($A\sqsupseteq\top$). A complete list of the relevant transformations and their required operators is provided in table 1. The transformation is possible for axioms involving concepts, roles and even individuals. Thus, the results presented here apply also to DL KBs that contain a non-empty Abox. In table 1, A, B refer to concept terms, R, S refer to role terms and a, b refer to individuals. All operators subscripted by $_R$ (in the third column) apply to role terms; the other operators apply to concept terms or individuals. In the second column, the subscript $_R$ has been dropped for

readability purposes; the domain of the respective operator is obvious in each case by the context. Likewise, connectives apply to concepts, roles or individuals, depending on the context. The symbol $\top_R$ refers to the top role, i.e., the role connecting every individual to every individual and the connective $\backslash\sqsubseteq$ stands for non-proper-inclusion. The symbols $\neg$ and $\exists$ refer to full (rather than atomic) negation and full (rather than limited) existential quantification respectively.

Not all the transformations in table 1 are straightforward; some of them use transformations appearing earlier in the table; all of them can be shown using model-theoretic arguments. What table 1 shows is that all the axiom types commonly used in DLs can be equivalently rewritten in the form $A \sqsupseteq \top$; this allows any set X to be transformed into an equivalent set X′ of the form required by lemma 1, provided that the DL allows for the operators necessary for the transformation.

But what about Y′? If Y is not of the desired form, then the same procedure cannot be used, because lemma 1 requires that the contracting expression is a unary set of the form $\{B \sqsupseteq \top\}$ and that there is an interpretation I for which $B^I = \varnothing$. But lemma 2 allows Y′ to be a (non-tautological) consequence of Y. One possible way to find Y′ is as follows: first select any non-tautological axiom of Y (there will definitely be such an axiom, as $Cn(\varnothing) \subset Cn(Y)$); then apply the relevant transformation of table 1 to this axiom. Suppose that the resulting axiom is $B \sqsupseteq \top$. Set $Y' = \{\forall \top_R.B \sqsupseteq \top\}$. Since the originally selected axiom is non-tautological, so is $B \sqsupseteq \top$; thus, there is an interpretation such that $B^I \neq \top^I$. It is easy to show that for this interpretation it holds that $(\forall \top_R.B)^I = \varnothing$. Moreover, it is obvious that $Y \vDash \{B \sqsupseteq \top\} \vDash \{\forall \top_R.B \sqsupseteq \top\} = Y'$ and $Cn(Y') \neq Cn(\varnothing)$, so Y′ is of the desired form. Again, the above transformations cannot be performed unless the underlying DL admits the necessary operators.

Combining the above thoughts with proposition 1, we conclude that, if the DL under question contains enough operators to allow us to perform the necessary transformations, then it is AGM-compliant. The required operators are the constant $\top$ and the (concept) connective $\sqsubseteq$ for the basic case (lemma 1), the operators of table 1 for the transformation of X plus the operator $\forall$ and the constant $\top_R$ for the transformation of Y. Notice that there is a certain amount of redundancy in table 1; for example, if $\neg$ and $\sqcap$ are included, then $\sqcup$ is not necessary. By eliminating this redundancy the following theorem can be shown:

Theorem 1 Assume a DL that contains the constants $\top$, $\top_R$, the operators $\neg$, $\sqcap$, $\forall$, $\neg_R$, $\sqcap_R$, $\{\dots\}$, the connective $\sqsubseteq$ (applicable to concepts) plus any of the connectives of table 1. Then this DL is AGM-compliant.

3.3 Discussion and Further Generalizations

Theorem 1 is important because it verifies that one particular family of DLs is AGM-compliant. However, its main importance lies in its numerous variations; theorem 1 should be viewed primarily as a "sample" theorem showing one possible application of our approach, because it actually

uncovers a whole pattern that can be used to show several similar theorems.

This is true because there are several different ways to generalize theorem 1 to show similar positive (AGM-compliance) results on DLs. First of all, the transformations of table 1 may not be the only possible ones. A similar table, containing similar transformations, would possibly generate a different set of operators required for AGM-compliance. The same holds for the transformation of Y.

Secondly, theorem 1 gives a *minimal* set of operators that are needed to guarantee AGM-compliance. Any additional operators do not bar AGM-compliance (notice however that any additional connectives might). Thus, all logics that contain more operators than the DL described in theorem 1 are AGM-compliant too.

Furthermore, some of the operators could be replaced by others; for example the combination $\{\neg, \forall\}$ is equivalent to the combination $\{\neg, \exists\}$, using the well-known equivalence: $\forall R.A \cong \neg \exists R.\neg A$. Similar facts hold for other operators as well. Moreover, the constants $\top$ and $\top_R$ could be removed from the minimal required set of operators, because they can be replaced by $A \sqcup \neg A$ and $R \sqcup \neg R$ respectively. Of course, this requires that there is at least one concept (A) and at least one role (R) in the namespace of the logic, but this is hardly an assumption. After all, what would DLs be without concepts or roles?

It should also be noticed that the operators required for AGM-compliance are depending on the necessary transformations and that we need one transformation per axiom type. Therefore, the required operators are depending on the variety of axiom types allowed in the logic; for example, if we are interested in DL KBs without an Abox, then the operator $\{\dots\}$ is not necessary, i.e., it could be removed from the minimal set of operators required for AGM-compliance. Similarly, certain logics disallow certain connectives or certain uses of connectives. Such restrictions might affect (i.e., reduce) the required minimal operator set (by allowing simpler transformations). On the other hand, if a DL admits any exotic connectives that are not considered in table 1, then we might need to add some operators to our minimal set in order to render the relevant transformations possible, if they are at all possible.

In theorem 1 we state that the DL under question must admit concept hierarchies (connective $\sqsubseteq$). This is a reasonable assumption, since most interesting DLs do satisfy it. However, it turns out that it is also an unnecessary one. To show that, we will use the concept of *equivalence of logics* (with respect to AGM-compliance) that appeared in [Flouris *et al.*, 2004b]. In the same paper it was shown that equivalent logics have the same status as far as AGM-compliance is concerned.

Using model-theoretic arguments, it is easy to show the following equivalences: $\{A \sqsupseteq \top\} \Leftrightarrow \{A \cong \top\} \Leftrightarrow \{\neg \forall \top_R.A \sqsubseteq \top\} \Leftrightarrow \{\neg \forall \top_R.A \not\cong \top\} \Leftrightarrow \{\neg \forall \top_R.A \not\sqsupseteq \top\} \Leftrightarrow \{A \backslash \sqsubseteq \top\} \Leftrightarrow \{disj(\top, \neg A)\}$. These equivalences are all definable using the minimal set of operators of theorem 1. Now, using these transformations and a proposition in [Flouris *et al.*, 2004b] (proposition 5), we can show that a

DL that contains the operators required by theorem 1 plus any of the usual concept connectives ($\cong$, $\sqsubset$, $\not\cong$, $\not\sqsupset$, $\backslash\sqsubset$, disj(.,.)), but not $\sqsubseteq$, is equivalent to a similar DL that contains the same operators and connectives as well as the connective $\sqsubseteq$. The latter logic (which includes $\sqsubseteq$) is AGM-compliant by theorem 1; thus the original logic (which does not include $\sqsubseteq$) is AGM-compliant too (since the two logics are equivalent). This argumentation shows that the existence of concept hierarchies in the DL under question is not mandatory for theorem 1 to be applicable; any of the usual concept connectives would do.

Another important observation regarding theorem 1 is that its proof is constructive; for each pair (X, Y) such that $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$, the proof constructs a set Z with the properties required by proposition 1. Thus, theorem 1 does not only show that certain DLs are AGM-compliant; it also suggests one possible contraction operator that satisfies the AGM postulates for these DLs.

This AGM-compliant contraction operator can be defined as follows: if $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$ then set $X-Y=Cn(Z)$ where Z is the set that the proof constructs. This is the principal case when defining a contraction operator; if $Cn(Y)=Cn(X)$, then set $X-Y=Cn(\varnothing)$; in any other case set $X-Y=Cn(X)$ to complete the definition of the (AGM-compliant) contraction operator.

Regarding the required operators of theorem 1, notice that many of them are standard in most interesting logics. One exception is the operator $\{...\}$, which is common in many DLs, but could not be classified as "standard". Fortunately, this operator is not necessary for AGM-compliance if the DL does not admit axioms about individuals (i.e., it has an empty Abox).

A more important problem is posed by the role operators $\neg_R$, $\sqcap_R$ and $\top_R$. These operators do not appear in most DLs and it is part of our future work to determine whether they are really necessary to guarantee AGM-compliance. As table 1 shows, these operators are required for axioms involving roles, such as role equivalence, role hierarchies and for some exotic role connectives, such as $\not\sqsubseteq$. The constant $\top_R$ is also necessary for the transformation of Y. At present, it looks like theorem 1 can only be applied to few very special and quite uninteresting DLs that do not admit these operators. For this reason, we encourage research on DLs that allow for these operators, due to their nice behavior with respect to updates.

One last (but certainly not least) observation that can be made is that theorem 1 and its variations do not provide a complete characterization of AGM-compliant DLs. However, it looks like this characterization is close to complete: all the AGM-compliant DLs that we have considered fall into one of the theorem's innumerable variations; those who don't, eventually turn out to be non-AGM-compliant (see the next sections for some examples). It is part of our future work to determine whether this pattern is simply coincidental or not.

4 Conditions for non-AGM-compliance

Unfortunately, not all DLs are compatible with the AGM theory. In our previous work [Flouris *et al.*, 2004b], a certain family of DLs was shown to be non-AGM-compliant. In this section, we show that our original result can be generalized to a far wider class containing many logics that allow for role axioms such as role equivalences and role hierarchies. Initially, we will show this simple lemma that is applicable in any logic:

Lemma 3 Consider a logic <L,Cn> and a set $X\subseteq L$. Set $Y=\{x\in Cn(X) \mid Cn(\{x\})\subset Cn(X)\}$. If $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$ then <L,Cn> is not AGM-compliant.

Proof
Take any $Z\subseteq L$ such that $Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$. For every $z\in Z$ it holds that $Cn(\{z\})\subseteq Cn(Z)\subset Cn(X)$, so $z\in Y$. Therefore $Cn(Y\cup Z)=Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$; thus, for the pair (X, Y) it holds that $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$ and there is no $Z\subseteq L$ with the properties required by proposition 1, so <L,Cn> is not AGM-compliant. $\square$

Lemma 3 states that, if a logic contains a belief which cannot be deduced by all its proper consequences combined, then this logic is not AGM-compliant. Unfortunately, this is the case for many DLs that allow for role hierarchies and/or role equivalences, but forbid the use of the operators $\neg_R$, $\sqcap_R$. Indeed, suppose that a logic allows one to define the axiom $R\sqsubseteq S$. This axiom has several implications, such as $\exists R.A\sqsubseteq\exists S.A$, $(\leq_1 R)\sqsupseteq(\leq_1 S)$ and others (see [Baader *et al.*, 2002] for details on the above operators). Set $X=\{R\sqsubseteq S\}$ and $Y=\{x\in Cn(X) \mid Cn(\{x\})\subset Cn(X)\}$, as in lemma 3. For several DLs, it so happens that $Cn(\varnothing)\subset Cn(Y)\subset Cn(X)$, so by lemma 3 such logics are not AGM-compliant:

Theorem 2 Suppose a DL with the following properties:
- The namespace contains at least two role names (say R, S) and at least one concept name (say A)
- The logic admits at least one of the operators $\forall$, $\exists$, $(\geq_n)$, $(\leq_n)$, for at least some n
- The logic admits any (or none, or all) of the operators and constants $\neg$, $\sqcap$, $\sqcup$, $^-$, $\top$, $\bot$, where the symbol $^-$ stands for the inverse role operator
- The logic admits only the connective $\sqsubseteq$ applicable to both concepts and roles

Then this DL is not AGM-compliant.

Sketch of Proof
Set $X=\{R\sqsubseteq S\}$, $Y=\{x\in Cn(X) \mid Cn(\{x\})\subset Cn(X)\}$ and define two interpretations I, I′, as follows:
$\Delta^I=\Delta^{I'}=\{a_1,a_2,b_1,b_2\}$
$B^I=B^{I'}=\varnothing$ for all concepts B
$R_0^I=R_0^{I'}=\varnothing$ for all roles R_0, other than R, S
$R^I=R^{I'}=\{(a_1,b_1), (b_1,a_1), (a_2,b_2), (b_2,a_2)\}$
$S^I=\{(a_1,b_1), (b_1,a_1), (a_2,b_2), (b_2,a_2)\}$
$S^{I'}=\{(a_1,b_2), (b_2,a_1), (a_2,b_1), (b_1,a_2)\}$
Notice that the two interpretations differ only in the interpretation of the role S.
Also notice that for these two interpretations and for every concept term C definable in the DLs considered by this theorem, it holds that $C^I=C^{I'}$; this can be shown using induction on the number of operators of C. Thus, any axiom

involving concept terms is satisfied by I if and only if it is satisfied by I′.

Furthermore, the absence of operators for roles (except possibly ⁻) in the DL under question allows us to show that all axioms in Y that describe relationships between roles are actually tautological.

Regarding the interpretations I, I′, notice that I satisfies X (obviously), so it satisfies Y (because $X \vDash Y$), thus any axiom $y \in Y$ is satisfied by I. If y involves roles, then it is tautological, so it is satisfied by I′. If y involves concepts, then, by the above result, y is satisfied by I′ since it is satisfied by I. Thus Y is satisfied by I′. On the other hand, X is obviously not satisfied by I′.

The above shows that there is an interpretation (I′) satisfying Y but not X, so $Cn(Y) \subset Cn(X)$. The existence of one of the operators $\forall$, $\exists$, $(\geq_n)$, $(\leq_n)$ (for some n) and of at least one concept (A) in the DL under question guarantees that Y is also non-tautological, because at least one of the non-tautological axioms $\exists R.A \sqsubseteq \exists S.A$, $\forall R.A \sqsupseteq \forall S.A$, $(\geq_n R) \sqsubseteq (\geq_n S)$, $(\leq_n R) \sqsupseteq (\leq_n S)$, for some n, will be in Y. Thus $Cn(\varnothing) \subset Cn(Y) \subset Cn(X)$.

These results, combined with lemma 3, give us the conclusion. □

The above negative result persists if the DL under question admits $\cong$ (applicable to both concepts and roles) instead of $\sqsubseteq$, or if it admits both connectives; the proof is identical. The same result can be shown (using the same proof) if we add transitive roles (the axiom Trans(.)) and/or qualified number restrictions. Furthermore, the DL under question remains non-AGM-compliant if only functional roles are admitted (R and S are already defined to be functional in the interpretations of the proof of theorem 2).

A further generalization of theorem 2 occurs by adding individuals, axioms with individuals and/or the operator {…} in the DL under question. The proof for this result is similar to the proof of theorem 2, the only difference being that the two interpretations I, I′ must be defined in a slightly different way. More specifically, we must add a new object, say c, in their domain (i.e., set $\Delta^I = \Delta^{I'} = \{a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2, c\}$) and map all individuals to this new object (i.e., set $x^I = x^{I'} = c$ for all individuals x), leaving the rest unchanged. With these new interpretations, all the steps of the proof can be repeated without changes to give us the desired result.

This analysis uncovers a rule of thumb regarding DLs: if theorem 1 cannot be applied, then there is a good chance that the prerequisites of lemma 3 will hold for a set of the form {$R \sqsubseteq S$} or {$R \cong S$} (for two roles R, S), so the DL under question is not AGM-compliant. This gives us a simple test to determine whether a DL is AGM-compliant or not, which is applicable to many (but not all) commonly used DLs.

5 Applications of our Method

5.1 Web Ontology Language (OWL)

As an application of the results shown in the previous sections, we study the Web Ontology Language [Dean *et al.*, 2004], also known as OWL. OWL is a knowledge representation language that is expected to play an important role in the future of the Semantic Web, as it has become a W3C recommendation. OWL comes in three "flavors", namely OWL Full, OWL DL and OWL Lite, with varying degree of expressive power and reasoning complexity. Only OWL DL and OWL Lite could be classified as DLs; OWL Full contains features not normally allowed in DLs. Unfortunately, all three flavors of OWL turn out to be non-AGM-compliant.

One of the reasons that OWL is not AGM-compliant has to do with the owl:imports construct. This construct is a special meta-logical annotation property forcing the parser to include another KB (ontology) in the current KB. In effect, a singular set X of the form X={owl:imports(O)} implies exactly what is implied by the ontology O. However, X is not equivalent to O, because there is no guarantee that the included ontology will remain static and unchanged. If O is modified, then X would be equivalent to the new version of O, but the new version of O would not necessarily be equivalent to O. This fact shows that the owl:imports(O) axiom cannot be replaced by the axioms of O, i.e., X and O are not equivalent. In fact, it holds that $Cn(X) = X \cup Cn(O)$ and $X \nsubseteq Cn(O)$.

The above analysis shows that lemma 3 is applicable for X={owl:imports(O)}, verifying that all three flavors of OWL (which contain the owl:imports axiom) are not AGM-compliant. This is true unless we could somehow guarantee that all ontologies would remain unchanged once they are created, which is a highly unrealistic assumption for the Semantic Web.

However, acknowledging the importance of OWL in the Semantic Web and the fact that owl:imports is not an essential feature of the language, we did not end our study at this point; instead, we addressed the question of what happens if owl:imports is removed from the language. In this respect, [Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 2004] is of great use, as it identifies OWL DL and OWL Lite (without annotations) as equivalent to certain DLs (namely $SHOIN^+(D)$ and $SHIF^+(D)$ respectively); both these DLs can be shown to be non-AGM-compliant, using a proof similar to the proof of theorem 2. Thus, OWL DL and OWL Lite are not AGM-compliant, even without their meta-logical features.

5.2 DLs in the Literature and AGM-compliance

Theorems 1 and 2 can be applied to several DLs that have already been considered in the literature. In this subsection we are providing an indicative (but not necessarily complete) list of DLs for which a definite answer regarding AGM-compliance can be given. For a definition of the logics below, refer to [Baader and Sattler, 2001; Baader *et al.*, 2002; Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 2004; Lutz and Sattler, 2000].

The following DLs can be shown to be non-AGM-compliant: SH, SHI, SHIN, SHOIN, SHOIN(D), $SHOIN^+$, $SHOIN^+(D)$, SHIQ, SHIF, SHIF(D), $SHIF^+$, $SHIF^+(D)$. None of the three flavors of OWL is AGM-compliant if the owl:imports axiom is included; OWL DL and OWL Lite without their annotation features are not AGM-compliant

either. If axioms involving roles (with $\sqsubseteq$ or $\cong$) are allowed, then FL_0, FL^- and $AL[U][E][N][C][Q][F]$ are non-AGM-compliant. All these facts can be proven using theorem 2 or similar arguments.

On the other hand, AGM-compliance can be achieved by adding role operators to the AL family. The logic $ALC(\sqcap_R, \sqcup_R, \neg_R)$ (with empty Abox) can be shown to be AGM-compliant. Notice that $\top_R$ and $\{\ldots\}$ are not included in $ALC(\sqcap_R, \sqcup_R, \neg_R)$, but this is not a problem, as discussed in section 3.3. Similarly, $ALC^{\neg}$, $ALC^{(\neg)}$, $ALC^{(\neg),\sqcap}$, $ALC^{(\neg),\sqcup}$ and $ALC^{(\neg),\sqcap,\sqcup}$ (with empty Abox and no axioms involving role terms) are AGM-compliant. The above positive results persist if we add more operators to any of the above logics; for example all of $ALC[U][E][N][Q][F](\sqcap_R, \sqcup_R, \neg_R)$ (with no Abox) are AGM-compliant. All these facts are direct applications of some variant of theorem 1.

The above analysis shows the importance of role operators in guaranteeing AGM-compliance in DLs used in practice; we are currently working on determining the validity of this conjecture, but the answer will likely be positive. Unfortunately, role operators appear in very few logics in the literature; for this reason, we highly encourage research on DLs that contain these operators, because of their nice behavior with respect to updates.

6 Conclusion and Future Work

It is generally acknowledged that belief change is a very important problem in the field of Artificial Intelligence, with applications in several research areas, including the area of commonsense reasoning. Indeed, part of a computer system's commonsense behavior is the ability to rationally update its KB and adapt itself to new information received.

The AGM theory [Alchourron *et al.*, 1985] is a mature and widely accepted approach in the belief change literature with several applications in a variety of fields. We believe that a further application of this theory in DLs is very promising and will hopefully indicate rational methods for DL KB (and ontology) updating.

The feasibility of this approach was initially studied in our previous work [Flouris *et al.*, 2004a; Flouris *et al.*, 2004b], where it was shown that the application of the AGM theory to logics outside the theory's original scope (such as DLs) is not always possible.

In the current paper, we specialized our original results to DLs by determining whether contracting a DL KB using the AGM model is possible for certain DLs and providing a roadmap allowing one to check AGM-compliance for DLs not covered by this work. We also described one possible AGM-compliant contraction operator for the DLs that were found to allow one. We are hoping that our work will help in uncovering the limitations of the AGM theory with respect to DLs, by verifying the applicability of the method in some cases and forcing us to consider alternative approaches in other cases.

One important application of our work lies in the field of the Semantic Web, where DLs play a primary role in the area of representation languages for ontologies [Baader *et al.*, 2003]. Our research has the potential to find applications in ontology merging and update and, consequently, in the automation of the task of ontology maintenance on the Semantic Web. Unfortunately though, one of the most important knowledge representation languages in the Semantic Web, OWL, was shown to be non-AGM-compliant.

Our study was kept at a fairly abstract level; we did not focus on any specific DLs but dealt with the DL family as a whole, including DLs that have not yet been considered in the literature. This approach has the extra benefit of allowing our results to be of use to researchers who develop new DLs; if the focus is on developing a DL that can be rationally updated, then AGM-compliance should be considered as a desirable feature of the new DL, along with high expressive power, low reasoning complexity etc. In this respect, we highly encourage research on DLs that admit role operators ($\neg_R$, $\sqcap_R$, $\sqcup_R$, $\top_R$), as such DLs provably exhibit nice behavior with respect to AGM-compliance.

The issue of applying the AGM theory to DLs is by no means concluded with this paper. We are currently trying to develop a complete characterization of AGM-compliant DLs by seeking more general formulations of theorems 1 and 2 that will engulf all their possible variations. We are hoping that these more general theorems will turn out to be complete characterizations of AGM-compliance for DLs.

Furthermore, we are planning to refine the proposed contraction operator for AGM-compliant DLs, to produce an operator that will be based on semantic rather than syntactic considerations, in addition to being AGM-compliant.

Notice that AGM-compliance simply guarantees the existence of a rational (in the AGM sense) contraction operator in the given DL; an AGM-compliant DL does not necessarily satisfy all results related to the AGM theory, unless these results are not depending on the AGM assumptions. Consequently, AGM-compliance is not the final word on the relation of the AGM theory to DLs.

However, AGM-compliance does constitute a necessary initial property that any rationally updatable DL should possess. For this reason, we believe that it is an important property that should be considered when determining the practical usefulness of a certain DL (whether currently under development or already proposed in the literature). It is part of our future work to determine how the property of AGM-compliance for DLs is related to other results related to the AGM theory, such as the various representation theorems, the supplementary postulates, the revision, update and erasure operators and their respective postulates, the Levi and Harper identities etc; see [Gärdenfors, 1992; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] for details on the above results.

References

[Alchourron *et al.*, 1985] Carlos Alchourron, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson. On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 50:510-530, 1985.

[Baader and Sattler, 2001] Franz Baader and Ulrike Sattler. An Overview of Tableau Algorithms for Description Logics. *Studia Logica*, 69:5-40, 2001.

[Baader *et al.*, 2002] Franz Baader, Diego Calvanese, Deborah McGuinness, Daniele Nardi, and Peter Patel-Schneider eds. *The Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation and Applications*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[Baader *et al.*, 2003] Franz Baader, Ian Horrocks, and Ulrike Sattler. Description Logics as Ontology Languages for the Semantic Web. In Dieter Hutter and Werner Stephan, eds., Festschrift in honor of Jörg Siekmann, *Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence*, Springer-Verlag, 2003.

[Dean *et al.*, 2004] Mike Dean, Guus Schreiber, Sean Bechhofer, Frank Van Harmelen, Jim Hendler, Ian Horrocks, Deborah McGuiness, Peter Patel-Schneider, and Lynn Andrea Stein. OWL Web Ontology Language Reference. W3C Recommendation, 2004. Available at: http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/.

[Flouris *et al.*, 2004a] Giorgos Flouris, Dimitris Plexousakis, and Grigoris Antoniou. Generalizing the AGM Postulates: Preliminary Results and Applications. In *Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning*, pp. 171-179, Whistler BC, Canada, 2004.

[Flouris *et al.*, 2004b] Giorgos Flouris, Dimitris Plexousakis, and Grigoris Antoniou. AGM Postulates in Arbitrary Logics: Initial Results and Applications. Technical Report FORTH-ICS/TR-336, April 2004.

[Gärdenfors, 1992] Peter Gärdenfors. Belief Revision: An Introduction. In Gärdenfors, P. ed. *Belief Revision*, pp. 1-20, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 2004] Ian Horrocks and Peter Patel-Schneider. Reducing OWL Entailment to Description Logic Satisfiability. *Journal of Web Semantics*, 1(4):345-357, 2004.

[Kang and Lau, 2004] Seung Hwan Kang and Sim Kim Lau. Ontology Revision Using the Concept of Belief Revision. In *Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information & Engineering Systems*, pp. 8-15, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004.

[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] Hirofumi Katsuno and Alberto Mendelzon. On the Difference Between Updating a Logical Database and Revising it. In Peter Gärdenfors, ed., *Belief Revision*, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[Lee and Meyer, 2004] Kevin Lee and Thomas Meyer. A Classification of Ontology Modification. In *Proceedings of the 17th Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 248-258, Cairns, Australia, 2004.

[Lutz and Sattler, 2000] Carsten Lutz and Ulrike Sattler. Mary Likes All Cats. In *Proceedings of the 2000 International Workshop in Description Logics*, pp. 213-226, Aachen, Germany, 2000.